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Glenn Bass and Lois Bass, plaintiffs and appellees herein,
respectfully petition this Honorable Court for a rehearing of the
above-entitled case. This petition is based on the grounds that

I. THE COURT OVERLOOKED CERTAIN MATERIAL FACTS
THAT ESTABLISH PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION;
and, in addition,
II. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WARRANT THE
EXTENSION OR MODIFICATION OF EXISTING LAW.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs and appellees herein pray
that Part I of the judgment and opinion of this Honorable Court
in this case (that the elements of slander of title were not made
out) be re-examined and reversed.
Respectfully submitted by
MARINUS HEYMERING, JR.
2729 Kenton Drive
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ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs and appellees respectfully submit that this
Honorable Court overlooked certain material facts and that the
circumstances of this case warrant the extension or modification
of existing law.

Clearly existing Utah law requires the plaintiff in an
action for slander of title to prove special damages, i.e.,
palpable economic loss.

Equally clear is that attorney fees may

not serve that purpose when they are incurred in the prosecution
of that action, but only when they have already been incurred of
necessity to remove an impediment or to correct a harm caused by
the slander, as in an action for quiet title to remove a specious
lien.

In this respect, Justice Stewart's opinion, in which the

rest of the court joined unanimously, cannot be faulted.

However, the emphasis in the briefs and at oral argument
before this Honorable Court on the issue of attorney fees may
well have served to obscure the fact that other special damages
were proved at trial as an element of the slander of title cause
of action.

Thus, the cause of action was in fact made out.

Additionally, where (as is the case here) actual harm has
resulted from the intentional commission of an economic tort, the
law should allow an award of punitive damages, and it should do
3
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so even if the amount or extent of actual damage cannot be
ascertained in money value.

Thus, the trial court's award of

$8,000 in attorney fees on the slander of title should be upheld
as punitive damages constituting a reasonable punishment and
deterrent for such conduct in this case.

I. THE COURT OVERLOOKED CERTAIN MATERIAL FACTS
THAT ESTABLISH PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION.

The material facts are as follows.

In August 1978 the

Basses had an option to buy the defendants Trimbles' mobile home.
Bass v. Planned Management Services, Inc., No. 19182, slip op.
at 1 (Utah August 18, 1988).
31, 1978.

I<d. at 1.

The option was good until October

In August 1978 the Basses employed a real

estate agent to sell the mobile home.

Id. at 2. Defendant Tommy

Spilker testified that he told some prospective buyers_ that legal
problems needed to be straightened out before they bought the
home.

Id. at 2.

(At the time, Spilker was a servant of

defendant Planned Management Services (PMS).

Ici. at 1, 2.)

Additionally, Spilker changed the locks on the mobile home and
removed the real estate agent's lockbox in mid-October 1978,
which denied the Basses and their real estate agent access to the
home.

Icl. at 2, 5.

When the Basses' option to buy expired at

the end of October 1978 the Trimbles reposessed the mobile home
and engaged Spilker to sell it, which he did shortly thereafter.
Id. at 2.
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The trial court found as a fact, both before and after PMS
filed its objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law
and judgment of the trial court, that Spilker made false
statements about the property to at least one potential buyer
with the intent to prevent the Basses from selling it.

Record at

120-121, 161. Likewise the trial court found as a fact, both
before and after PMS1 objection, that Spilker changed the locks
on the mobile home and removed the lockbox with the intent to
prevent the Basses from selling it. Record at 120-121, 161.

Spilkerfs actions in changing the locks and removing the
lockbox without privilege to do so spoke even louder than his
words the (false) assertion that the Basses had no right to
possess or sell the mobile home.

This assertion was not only

false but it also disparaged the Basses' legitimate title
interest in the mobile home and it cast a larger and more
definite cloud over the Basses' title interest than the filing of
a wrongful lien would have.

The assertion was also clearly

malicious because it was made with the intent to prevent the
Basses from selling the mobile home, and because it evidenced a
clear disregard for the Basses' title interest and an intent to
vex them and injure their prospective economic interests.^
••

1. Judge Durham did state from the bench at the conclusion
of the trial that: "The court further finds that Mr. Spilker
interfered with the Basses' efforts to sell their trailer home
prior to November 1, 1978, and I can make no finding that that
was malicious, willful or wanton." Record at 601. The trial
court's oral comments from the bench have no force or effect.
(continued...)
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2, Proof of the loss of any sale of the slandered property
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slandered while the Basses were entitled to posess and sell it
makes his conduct all the more reprehensible.

II.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WARRANT THE
EXTENSION OR MODIFICATION OF EXISTING LAW.

As Justice Stewart correctly observed, the essence of
slander of title is the interference with economic interests
rather than any injury to reputation.

Bass, slip op. at 3-4.

It

is the policy of Utah, as indeed it should be, to protect the
economic interests of its citizens from interference.

For

example, this Honorable Court recently recognized the common law
tort of intentional interference with prospective economic
relations.

Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293,

304 (Utah 1982).

In light of this and other developments in the

law, the circumstances of this case warrant the following
extensions or modifications of existing law.

A.

PROOF OF SPECIAL DAMAGES SHOULD NO LONGER BE REQUIRED AS AN
ELEMENT OF SLANDER OF TITLE WHERE THE TORT IS COMMITTED
INTENTIONALLY.

The existing law of slander of title requires proof of
special damages in order to prevail.

There are no general or

presumed damages in this cause of action.

The reason for this

lies principally in the antiquated distinction between trespass
and trespass on the case.

"[W]hether such [actual] damage is

essential to the existence of a cause of action for a particular
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The facts in this case show that defendant PMS, through its
servant Tommy Spilker, took several affirmative actions with the
intent to prevent the Basses from selling the mobile home. The
Basses were unable to sell the mobile home (whether or not
proximately caused by defendants1 actions).

PMS profited from

Spilker's sale of the mobile home shortly after the Basses1
interest (option to buy) expired.

The harm intended (and not

merely wished for) by defendants did occur.

The Basses' loss is

actual (if not quantifiable) and the defendants profited from
Spilker's conduct, which was improper both in purpose (to
frustrate the Basses' right to sell) and in means (e.g., changing
the locks without privilege to do so).

Whether or not it finds that the facts discussed above in
Point I show actual damages in connection with the slander of
title cause of action, this Honorable Court should find that the
egregious nature of defendant Spilker's intentional conduct
warrants judgment for the plaintiffs for slander of title.
courts have already shown the way.

Other

See Paulson v. Kustom

Enterprises, Inc.y 157 Mont. 188, 483 P.2d 708, 716 (Mont. 1971)
(involving an action for slander of title and citing as the
existing law of Montana Fauver v. Wilkoske, 123 Mont. 228, 211
P.2d 420 (Mont. 1949) for the proposition that punitive damages
I
may be awarded even though the amount or extent of actual damages
cannot be shown; a fortiori a cause of action would be made out).
(
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The elements of a cause of action for intentional
interference with prospective economic relations are "(1) that
the defendant intentionally interfered with plaintiff's existing
or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or
by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff."

Leigh

Furniture, supra 657 P.2d at 304. In this case, defendant
Spilker intentionally interfered with both the Basses' present
right to posess and with their potential economic gain from the
sale of the mobile home.

Record at 120-121, 161. Spilker did so

both with an improper motive (to frustrate the Basses' right to
sell) and by improper means (false remarks in derogation of the
Basses' title; changing the locks in derogation of the Basses'
title).

Id.

Spilker's actions caused injury to the Basses: not

only actual damages of $76.70 for 10 days' disposession, but also
irreparable harm for the frustration of their potential to profit
from the sale of the mobile home.
<

C.

SUBSTANTIAL PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE DESPITE THE PAUCITY OF ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
(

It is well settled that punitive damages may be awarded in
actions for slander of title.

Olsen v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443,

253 P.2d 510 (Utah 1951); Dowse v. Doris Trust, 116 Utah 106,
208 P.2d 956 (Utah 1949).

Punitive damages may also be awarded

in actions for intentional interference with prospective economic
relations.

Leigh Furniture, supra 657 P.2d at 312-313.
(

11
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The general rule in Utah is that the purposes of punitive
damages are:
* * * [A] punishment of the defendant for particularly
grievous injury caused by conduct which is not only
wrongful, but which is wilfull and malicious so that it
seems to one's sense of justice that mere recompense for
actual loss is inadequate and that the plaintiff should have
added compensation; and that the defendant should suffer
some additional penalty for that character of wrongful
conduct; and also that such a verdict should serve as a
wholesome warning to others not to engage in similar
misdoings.
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975) quoted with
approval in Leigh Furniture, supra 657 P.2d at 312. The general
rule in Utah is also that the amount of punitive damages awarded
should ordinarily bear some reasonable (aliquot) relation to the
award of compensatory damages (Prince v. Petersen, 538 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1975)), but such a consideration is only one among many.
Leigh Furniture, supra 657 P.2d at 312.

The facts adduced at trial support an award of substantial
punitive damages in this case pursuant to the policy set forth in
Kesler v. Rogers, supra.

Olson v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443, 235 P.2d

510 (Utah 1951); Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 116 Utah 106, 208 P.2d
956 (Utah 1949); cf. Sproule v. Parks, 116 Utah 368, 210 P.2d 436
(Utah 1949) (punitive damages not awarded on appeal where they
were not awarded at trial).3

But see Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585

J

. Justice Stewart's opinion in this case characterizes the
trial court's award of attorney fees as "special damages" and
"gratuitous." Bass, slip op. at 4. In fact, although the record
would support such an inference, it is not at all clear that the
award of attorney fees was intended to be compensatory. The
(continued...)
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P.2d 775 (Utah 1978) (action in equity) (in which this Honorable
Court reversed the trial court's denial of punitive damages and
stated that the amount of punitive damages should be determined
from the nature of the conduct rather than the amount of
compensatory damages).

Some courts have held that punitive damages may be awarded
even in the absence of actual or compensatory damages. See,
e.g., Nappe v. Anschelewitz, 97 N.J. 37, 477 A.2d 1224 (N.J.
1984); Fauver v. Wilkoske, 123 Mont. 228, 211 P.2d 420 (Mont.
1949).
Because of the fortuitous circumstances that an injured
plaintiff failed to prove compensatory damages, the
defendant should not be freed of responsibility for
aggravated misconduct. People should not be able with
impunity to trench upon a right.
Nappe v. Anschelewitz, supra 477 A.2d at 1231.

Whether or not it finds that the facts discussed above in
Point I show actual (special) damages in connection with a cause
of action for slander of title or intentional interference with
prospective economic relations, this Honorable Court should award
J

(...continued)
trial court's memorandum opinion states simply that "Plaintiffs
are entitled to judgment * * * for attorney's fees on the slander
of title (See Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 116 U. 107 (1949))."
Record at 122. It is also plausible, though equally unclear,
that the award was intended to be punitive. The amount to be
awarded for attorney fees was still subject to proof when the
trial court's memorandum opinion was filed. Id. It is difficult
to conceive that such unliquidated damages would be considered
special damages.
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substantial punitive damages to plaintiff.

A reasonable measure

of punitive damages in this case is the sum of $8000 awarded by
the trial court.

See generally Annot., 40 ALR4th 11, §4 at 28-

33f §15 at 88-93, and §16(e) at 99-101 (1985); Annot., 7 ALR4th
1220 (1981); and Annot., 30 ALR3d 1443 (1970).

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs and appellees
pray this Honorable Court to grant their petition for rehearing,
reverse its decision with respect to its finding of no cause for
slander of title, and reinstate the trial court's award of $8000
plus interest as punitive damages.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31 ^~day of

fh^wjT'

, 1988

MARINUS HEYMERING, JR.

Attorney for Petitioners
(Plaintiffs and Appellees)
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